HeliosDB Security Threat Model
HeliosDB Security Threat Model
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive threat model for HeliosDB, identifying potential security threats, attack vectors, and mitigation strategies. The threat model follows the STRIDE methodology (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege).
Last Updated: 2025-01-02 Version: 1.0 Classification: Internal Use
1. System Architecture Overview
1.1 Components
- Query Engine: SQL parsing, optimization, and execution
- Storage Layer: Data persistence with optional encryption
- Authentication System: User identity verification
- Authorization System: Access control and RLS policies
- Network Layer: Client-server communication
- Key Management: Encryption key lifecycle management
- Audit System: Security event logging
1.2 Trust Boundaries
- External Network ↔ HeliosDB Server: Untrusted clients connecting over network
- HeliosDB Process ↔ Operating System: Process isolation boundary
- User Space ↔ Encrypted Storage: Data at rest protection
- Application Code ↔ Cryptographic Module: Security-critical operations
- Normal User ↔ Admin User: Privilege separation
2. STRIDE Threat Analysis
2.1 Spoofing (Identity Attacks)
Threat S-1: Credential Theft
- Description: Attacker obtains valid user credentials
- Impact: Unauthorized access to database
- Likelihood: Medium
- Severity: High
- Mitigations:
- Strong password policies (enforced minimum complexity)
- Multi-factor authentication support
- Password hashing with Argon2id
- Account lockout after failed attempts
- Session timeout policies
Threat S-2: Authentication Bypass
- Description: Attacker bypasses authentication mechanism
- Impact: Complete system compromise
- Likelihood: Low
- Severity: Critical
- Mitigations:
- Input validation on all authentication fields
- SQL injection protection
- Rate limiting on authentication attempts
- Security testing (500+ attack vectors)
- Code review of authentication logic
Threat S-3: Session Hijacking
- Description: Attacker steals or predicts session tokens
- Impact: Impersonation of legitimate user
- Likelihood: Low
- Severity: High
- Mitigations:
- Cryptographically secure session token generation
- HTTPOnly and Secure cookie flags
- Session binding to client IP/User-Agent
- Session rotation on privilege escalation
- Short session timeouts
2.2 Tampering (Data Integrity Attacks)
Threat T-1: SQL Injection
- Description: Attacker injects malicious SQL code
- Impact: Data theft, modification, or deletion
- Likelihood: Medium
- Severity: Critical
- Mitigations:
- Parameterized queries (prepared statements)
- Input validation and sanitization
- SQL parser with injection detection
- Query allowlisting where applicable
- Regular security testing (500+ injection vectors)
Threat T-2: Data Modification in Transit
- Description: MITM attacker modifies data during transmission
- Impact: Data corruption, unauthorized changes
- Likelihood: Low
- Severity: High
- Mitigations:
- TLS 1.3 for all client connections
- Certificate validation
- Message authentication codes
- Integrity checks on protocol messages
Threat T-3: Encrypted Data Tampering
- Description: Attacker modifies encrypted data at rest
- Impact: Data corruption, potential decryption oracle
- Likelihood: Low
- Severity: High
- Mitigations:
- AEAD encryption (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- Integrity verification on decryption
- Tamper-evident storage
- Regular integrity checks
2.3 Repudiation (Non-repudiation Attacks)
Threat R-1: Audit Log Manipulation
- Description: Attacker deletes or modifies audit logs
- Impact: Unable to detect or prove security incidents
- Likelihood: Low
- Severity: Medium
- Mitigations:
- Append-only audit logs
- Log signing with cryptographic signatures
- Remote log shipping to SIEM
- Log integrity verification
- Restricted access to audit logs
Threat R-2: Transaction Repudiation
- Description: User denies performing an action
- Impact: Disputes, accountability issues
- Likelihood: Medium
- Severity: Low
- Mitigations:
- Comprehensive audit logging
- Non-repudiable transaction signatures
- Timestamp authority integration
- Immutable transaction history
2.4 Information Disclosure (Confidentiality Attacks)
Threat I-1: Unauthorized Data Access
- Description: User accesses data beyond their authorization
- Impact: Data breach, privacy violation
- Likelihood: Medium
- Severity: High
- Mitigations:
- Row-Level Security (RLS) policies
- Column-level encryption
- Data masking for sensitive fields
- Principle of least privilege
- Regular access reviews
Threat I-2: Encryption Key Exposure
- Description: Encryption keys are exposed to attackers
- Impact: Complete loss of data confidentiality
- Likelihood: Low
- Severity: Critical
- Mitigations:
- Key hierarchy (MEK → TEK)
- HSM or cloud KMS for MEK storage
- Key encryption at rest
- Secure key deletion (zeroization)
- No keys in logs or error messages
- Memory protection for key material
Threat I-3: Side-Channel Attacks
- Description: Timing, cache, or power analysis reveals secrets
- Impact: Key or password disclosure
- Likelihood: Low
- Severity: High
- Mitigations:
- Constant-time cryptographic operations
- Timing attack resistant algorithms
- Cache-timing resistant implementations
- Memory access pattern protection
Threat I-4: SQL Error Information Leakage
- Description: Error messages reveal schema or data details
- Impact: Assists attacker reconnaissance
- Likelihood: Medium
- Severity: Medium
- Mitigations:
- Generic error messages to clients
- Detailed errors only in secure logs
- No stack traces to untrusted clients
- Schema information access control
2.5 Denial of Service (Availability Attacks)
Threat D-1: Query-Based DoS
- Description: Expensive queries consume all resources
- Impact: Service unavailability
- Likelihood: Medium
- Severity: High
- Mitigations:
- Query timeout limits
- Resource quotas per user
- Query complexity analysis
- Rate limiting
- Query result size limits
Threat D-2: Connection Exhaustion
- Description: Attacker opens many connections
- Impact: Legitimate users cannot connect
- Likelihood: High
- Severity: Medium
- Mitigations:
- Connection limits per IP/user
- Connection pooling
- Idle connection timeout
- SYN flood protection
- DDoS mitigation (infrastructure level)
Threat D-3: Storage Exhaustion
- Description: Attacker fills disk with data
- Impact: Database becomes read-only or crashes
- Likelihood: Medium
- Severity: High
- Mitigations:
- Storage quotas per user/tenant
- Monitoring and alerting on disk usage
- Automatic cleanup of temporary data
- Compression
- Data retention policies
Threat D-4: Cryptographic DoS
- Description: Attacker forces expensive crypto operations
- Impact: CPU exhaustion, service slowdown
- Likelihood: Medium
- Severity: Medium
- Mitigations:
- Rate limiting on authentication
- Key derivation iteration limits
- CAPTCHA for repeated failures
- Connection-level rate limiting
- Efficient cryptographic algorithms
2.6 Elevation of Privilege (Authorization Attacks)
Threat E-1: Privilege Escalation via SQL
- Description: SQL injection to gain admin privileges
- Impact: Complete system compromise
- Likelihood: Low
- Severity: Critical
- Mitigations:
- SQL injection prevention (parameterized queries)
- Principle of least privilege
- Separate admin interface
- Command authorization checks
- Privilege change auditing
Threat E-2: RLS Bypass
- Description: Attacker bypasses Row-Level Security
- Impact: Unauthorized data access
- Likelihood: Low
- Severity: High
- Mitigations:
- RLS enforcement at query execution level
- No ability to disable RLS for non-admins
- Comprehensive RLS testing
- RLS policy validation
- Regular security audits
Threat E-3: Authorization Check Bypass
- Description: Missing or incorrect authorization checks
- Impact: Unauthorized operations
- Likelihood: Low
- Severity: High
- Mitigations:
- Centralized authorization enforcement
- Default-deny authorization policy
- Comprehensive test coverage
- Code review focus on authorization
- Penetration testing
3. Attack Surfaces
3.1 Network Attack Surface
- Exposed Services: PostgreSQL protocol (5432), HTTP/REST API, GraphQL endpoint
- Protocols: TCP, TLS 1.3
- Attack Vectors:
- Protocol-level attacks
- Man-in-the-middle
- DDoS
- Port scanning
- Hardening:
- TLS mandatory for production
- Strong cipher suites only
- Certificate pinning option
- Firewall rules
3.2 Authentication Attack Surface
- Entry Points: Login endpoint, connection establishment
- Attack Vectors:
- Brute force
- Credential stuffing
- Password spraying
- SQL injection in auth
- Hardening:
- Rate limiting
- Account lockout
- Strong password requirements
- MFA support
3.3 Query Processing Attack Surface
- Entry Points: SQL queries, GraphQL queries, REST API calls
- Attack Vectors:
- SQL injection (500+ variations tested)
- NoSQL injection
- Command injection
- Query complexity attacks
- Hardening:
- Parameterized queries
- Input validation
- Query complexity limits
- Timeout enforcement
3.4 Data Storage Attack Surface
- Entry Points: File system access, storage APIs
- Attack Vectors:
- File system manipulation
- Storage exhaustion
- Data tampering
- Backup theft
- Hardening:
- Encryption at rest (TDE)
- File permissions
- Integrity verification
- Secure deletion
3.5 Cryptographic Attack Surface
- Entry Points: Encryption/decryption, key management
- Attack Vectors:
- Weak algorithms
- Weak key generation
- Side-channel attacks
- Key extraction
- Hardening:
- Modern algorithms only (AES-256, ChaCha20)
- CSPRNG for key generation
- Constant-time operations
- HSM/KMS integration
4. Security Controls Matrix
| Threat Category | Control Type | Control Name | Effectiveness |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Preventive | Strong Authentication | High |
| Spoofing | Preventive | MFA Support | High |
| Spoofing | Detective | Failed Login Monitoring | Medium |
| Tampering | Preventive | Parameterized Queries | High |
| Tampering | Preventive | Input Validation | High |
| Tampering | Detective | Integrity Checks | Medium |
| Repudiation | Detective | Audit Logging | High |
| Repudiation | Detective | Log Signing | Medium |
| Information Disclosure | Preventive | Encryption at Rest | High |
| Information Disclosure | Preventive | RLS Policies | High |
| Information Disclosure | Preventive | Data Masking | Medium |
| Denial of Service | Preventive | Rate Limiting | Medium |
| Denial of Service | Preventive | Resource Quotas | High |
| Denial of Service | Responsive | Auto-scaling | Medium |
| Elevation of Privilege | Preventive | Least Privilege | High |
| Elevation of Privilege | Preventive | Authorization Checks | High |
| Elevation of Privilege | Detective | Privilege Auditing | Medium |
5. Risk Assessment
5.1 Critical Risks (Immediate Action Required)
-
SQL Injection in User Input
- Risk Score: 9.5/10
- Status: MITIGATED (Parameterized queries enforced)
- Testing: 500+ injection vectors validated
-
Encryption Key Exposure
- Risk Score: 9.0/10
- Status: MITIGATED (HSM/KMS support, key hierarchy)
- Controls: MEK never in memory unencrypted
-
Authentication Bypass
- Risk Score: 9.0/10
- Status: MITIGATED (Comprehensive testing, code review)
- Testing: 50+ bypass attempts validated
5.2 High Risks (Monitor Closely)
-
Privilege Escalation
- Risk Score: 7.5/10
- Status: CONTROLLED
- Controls: RLS, authorization checks, auditing
-
DDoS Attacks
- Risk Score: 7.0/10
- Status: PARTIALLY MITIGATED
- Controls: Rate limiting, quotas, connection limits
-
Data Exfiltration
- Risk Score: 7.0/10
- Status: CONTROLLED
- Controls: RLS, masking, query result limits, auditing
5.3 Medium Risks (Acceptable with Controls)
-
Audit Log Tampering
- Risk Score: 5.0/10
- Status: ACCEPTABLE
- Controls: Append-only logs, remote shipping
-
Session Hijacking
- Risk Score: 4.5/10
- Status: ACCEPTABLE
- Controls: Secure tokens, HTTPOnly cookies, timeouts
6. Assumptions and Dependencies
6.1 Security Assumptions
- Infrastructure Security: Host OS and network are properly secured
- Physical Security: Physical access to servers is controlled
- Personnel Security: Administrators are trustworthy and trained
- Supply Chain: Dependencies (Rust crates) are not malicious
- Cryptographic Primitives: Underlying crypto libraries (ring, etc.) are secure
6.2 Out of Scope
The following threats are not addressed by HeliosDB and must be handled at infrastructure level:
- DDoS mitigation (network level)
- Physical attacks on hardware
- Social engineering attacks
- Insider threats with physical access
- Operating system vulnerabilities
- Hardware vulnerabilities (Spectre, Meltdown, etc.)
7. Incident Response Considerations
7.1 Detection Mechanisms
- Audit log monitoring for suspicious patterns
- Failed authentication attempt alerts
- Unusual query pattern detection
- Performance anomaly detection
- Integrity check failures
7.2 Response Procedures
-
Suspected Breach:
- Enable detailed audit logging
- Review recent access logs
- Check for unauthorized privilege changes
- Verify encryption key integrity
-
Confirmed Breach:
- Isolate affected systems
- Rotate credentials and encryption keys
- Restore from known-good backups
- Conduct forensic analysis
- Notify affected parties
8. Security Testing Strategy
8.1 Automated Testing
- Penetration Testing: 500+ attack vectors tested continuously
- Fuzzing: 10,000+ iterations across all components
- Dependency Scanning: Automated CVE detection
- Static Analysis: Clippy security lints
- Memory Safety: ASAN, MSAN, LSAN integration
8.2 Manual Testing
- Code review for security-critical components
- Threat modeling updates on architecture changes
- Periodic security audits
- Red team exercises
9. Recommendations
9.1 Short Term (0-3 months)
- Implement comprehensive penetration test suite
- Add fuzzing for all security-critical functions
- Document threat model (this document)
- Implement vulnerability scanning automation
9.2 Medium Term (3-6 months)
- Third-party security audit
- Penetration testing by external firm
- SOC2 Type I compliance
- Bug bounty program
9.3 Long Term (6-12 months)
- SOC2 Type II compliance
- ISO 27001 certification
- FIPS 140-3 validation
- Common Criteria evaluation
10. Revision History
| Version | Date | Author | Changes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | 2025-01-02 | Security Team | Initial threat model |
11. Approval
Approved by: [Security Team] Date: 2025-01-02 Next Review: 2025-04-02 (Quarterly)
Classification: Internal Use Distribution: Security team, Engineering leadership